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For the last several decades, labor law classes around the country have
annually broken out in laughter at the thought that lawyers and judges
would draw such a spurious distinction between discharging and perma-
nently replacing an [economic striker]. But to ordinary workers, this legal
distinction is no joke at all. The employee may have spent twenty to thirty
years with a firm, investing his whole working life buildinrg up a stake of
experience and security in this enterprise that cannot possibly be duplicated
somewhere else. Then, if the employee chooses to go out on strike, pursu-
ing the course labor law says is the only way to try to improve (or even
maintain) terms and conditions of employment, the firm's management is
free to hire replacements who with less than twenty or thirty minutes on
the job get a permanent claim to the position as against the striker.1
* Partner, Crandall, Pyles & Haviland, Charleston, West Virginia; J.D. 1985, Univer-
sity of North Carolina; M.B.A. 1985, University of North Carolina; B.A. 1981, University of
North Carolina.
1. Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the
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I. INTRODUCTION
This country needs sweeping labor law reform if the ongoing and
well-documented decline of the labor movement is to be reversed.
Although many facets of labor law are ripe for reform,4 no single
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 88-89 (1991) (statement of Prof. Paul C. Weiler, Harvard Law School). In contrast
to economic strikers, unfair labor practice strikers, i.e., those who are displaced in a strike
caused or prolonged by an employer's unfair labor practice(s), cannot be permanently re-
placed and are entitled to reinstatement on demand.
2. At the direction of President Clinton, labor law reform currently is being studied
by the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, a 10-member panel
chaired by former Secretary of Labor John T. Dunlop [hereinafter the "Dunlop Commis-
sion"]. On June 2, 1994, the Dunlop Commission released an interim report reviewing its
hearings to date. COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, FACT
FINDING REPORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR & U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (1994)
[hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION FACT FINDING REPORT]. It is anticipated the Dunlop Com-
mission will issue a final report in late 1994 recommending specific legislative reforms.
Charles J. Morris, widely respected Professor Emeritus at Southern Methodist University, has
advised the Dunlop Commission that "a major factor in the decline of the union move-
ment . . . was the state of [labor] law . . . and the responses of the parties to the legal
opportunities presented by the state of the law." Recommendations of Professor Charles J.
Morris to the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 6 (Jan. 10, 1994).
3. An interesting analysis of labor's decline since the Golden Age of manufacturing
is reflected in the case studies in GRAND DESIGNS: THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE STRATEGIES
ON WORKERS, UNIONS, AND COMMUNITIES (Charles Craypo & Bruce Nissen eds., 1993),
which focuses on the industrial Midwest. Professors Craypo and Nissen conclude, contrary
to the conventional wisdom, that the higher costs of production associated with union wage
scales are by no means the most important factor in labor's decline. Instead, they embrace
the "relative power" model, which holds that other forces determine the market success of
firms and that U.S. employers resist and threaten unions because they want uncontested
power over production and the allocation of earnings. Id. at 227-29.
Corporations have exploited four conditions to achieve hegemony over unions and
communities: (1) production overcapacity; (2) ineffective, lethargic responses to corporate
mobility and demands for concessions by unions and industrial communities; (3) corporate
secrecy and centralized authority; and (4) a rightward political tilt which made public policy
"indifferent or hostile to unions and collective bargaining." Id. at 231.
4. RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW (Sheldon Friedman et al.
eds., 1994); WILLIAM B. GOULD, IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 156-79 (1993) (Professor Gould currently serves as Chairman
of the NLRB); Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871
2
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 96, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol96/iss3/6
1994] RESTORING BALANCE TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
issue is of greater importance than restoring balance to collective bar-
gaining by preventing discrimination against economic strikers. With
strike activity at an all-time nadir,5 passage of the Workplace Fairness
Act currently pending in the Senate' is labor's highest legislative pri-
ority.
This article will present the union perspective on workplace fair-
ness reform. The curious origin of the Mackay doctrine and the dra-
(1987); Laurence E. Gold, The Capricious Lure of Labor Law Regulation, 89 W. VA. L.
REV. 883 (1987); Lance Compa, Comments on Richard Trumka's 'Why Labor Law Has
Failed', 89 W. VA. L. REV. 909 (1987); Paul Weiler, Striking a New Balance: Freedom of
Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1984); Paul
Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA,
96 HARv. L. Rev. 1769 (1983).
5. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has confirmed that major strike activity in
1993 matched the all-time low level set in 1992. Only 35 major work stoppages, defined as
strikes or lockouts involving 1000 or more workers for more than one shift, occurred in
each year. The 31-week strike by approximately 17,000 members of the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA) against the Bituminous Coal Operators Association (BCOA)
accounted for more than half the total lost workdays throughout the U.S. economy. Work
Stoppages: Record Low Number of Strikes Continues Into 1993, BLS Reports, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 28 (Feb. 11, 1994). The peak number of major work stoppages was 470
in 1952; the number of strikes "started plummeting in 1981 after President Reagan fired
striking air-traffic controllers." Rochelle Sharpe, Labor Letter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1994, at
1, col. 5.
6. S. 55, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 5, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (H.R.
5 is comparable to S. 55 in substance). S. 55 would add a sixth employer unfair labor
practice to Section 8(a) of the NLRA, making it unlawful for an employer:
(6) to promise, to threaten, to take other action-
(i) to hire a permanent replacement for an employee who-
(A) at the commencement of a labor dispute was an employee of the employer in
a bargaining unit in which a labor organization was the certified or recognized
exclusive representative or, on the basis of written authorizations by a majority of
the unit employees, was seeking to be so certified or recognized; and
(B) in connection with that dispute has engaged in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection through that
labor organization; or
(ii) to withhold or deny any other employment right or privilege to an employee,
who meets the criteria of subparagraph (A) and (B) of clause (i) and who is
working for or has unconditionally offered to return to work for the employer, out
of a preference for any other individual that is based on the fact that the individu-
al is performing, has performed or has indicated a willingness to perform bargain-
ing unit work for the employer during the labor dispute.
Id. The Railway Labor Act also would be amended to accomplish the same results.
3
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matic changes in the legal, economic, and political climates since 1938
will be reviewed. Then, the principal arguments in favor of banning
discrimination against economic strikers will be surveyed. Finally, the
various legislative proposals for prohibiting discrimination against eco-
nomic strikers will be analyzed.
II. ORIGIN OF THE MACKAY DOCTRINE
Any observer of labor law would be hard-pressed to identify a
more momentous instance of winning the battle but losing the war
than the case of NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.' Although
the Supreme Court enforced an NLRB order favoring a union, Mackay
is neither cited nor remembered as a case labor won. The Court's
opinion is noteworthy not only because it introduced a duplicitous
distinction between firing and "permanently replacing" economic strik-
ers into jurisprudence under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),
but also because of the remarkably off-handed manner in which the
Court announced such a far-reaching rule of law.
As many commentators have observed over the years, the vast
majority of them sharply critical of the Mackay doctrine,8 the issue of
permanent replacement of economic strikers was not properly before
the Supreme Court. The Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. maintained
7. 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
8. See, e.g., Daniel Pollitt, Mackay Radio: Turn It Off, Time It Out, 25 U.S.F.L.
REV. 295 (1991); Walter Kamiat, Strikers and Replacements: a Labor Union Perspective,
Proceedings of the N.Y.U. 43rd Annual National Conference on Labor (1990); Paul Weiler,
Striking a New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation,
98 HARV. L. REv. 351, 387-91 (1984); Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wag-
ner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 301-02
(1978); Hal K. Gillespie, The Mackay Doctrine and the Myth of Business Necessity, 50
TEX. L. REV. 782 (1972); George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning
a Misnomer-"Protected" Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378 (1969); Julius G.
Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1203-04 (1967); Leonard B. Boudin, The Rights of Strikers,
35 ILL. L. REV. 817, 830-32 (1941); Jack J. Canzoneri, Note, Management's Attitudes and
the Need for The Workplace Fairness Act, 41 BuFF. L. REV. 205 (1993); David Radtke,
Note, Banning the Use of Permanent Replacements: Slaying Its Opponent's Trojan Horse,
1992 DET. C.L. REV. 881 (1992); Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE
L. J. 630 (1966).
[Vol. 96:685
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offices in San Francisco and elsewhere for the receipt and transmission
of telegraph, radio, cable, and other messages. On October 4, 1935, all
of the employees in the San Francisco office went out on strike; the
company responded by importing workers from its Los Angeles, Chica-
go, and New York offices to fill the strikers' places. What was sup-
posed to be a general strike nationwide failed to materialize, and the
San Francisco strikers voted to return to work on the evening of Octo-
ber 7, 1935. The company indicated that all strikers could return to
work; the only problem was that it had already told eleven employees,
who transferred in during the strike, that they could continue working
in San Francisco if they so desired. Consequently, the company drew
up a list of eleven strikers who would be required to fie applications
for reinstatement with headquarters in New York.
As matters developed, only five of the eleven replacement workers
elected to remain in San Francisco. Six of the strikers were allowed to
return to work, but the company refused to reinstate five strikers, all
of whom had been "prominent in the activities of the union and in
connection with the strike." 9 The union responded with an unfair labor
practice charge alleging violations of sections 8(1) and (3) of the Wag-
ner Act, which took effect on July 5, 1935. The NLRB held for the
union, reasoning that the company had taken advantage of the labor
dispute to rid itself of the leaders of the recent strike. The Board
ordered the company to reinstate the five strike leaders, but expressly
refused to decide whether the employer had a right to hire permanent
replacements for the strikers, commenting "since we find a decision on
the point is not necessary to the final judgment in this case, we will
not decide the matter."' 0 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused
to enforce the NLRB's Order," and the case was appealed to the Su-
preme Court, which only months earlier had upheld the constitutional-
ity of the Act.
12
The Supreme Court had no difficulty enforcing the NLRB's deci-
sion insofar as the employer had violated the Act by discriminatorily
9. In re Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. at 339.
10. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 1 NLRB 201, 216 (1936).
11. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 87 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1937).
12. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5
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denying reinstatement to the strike leaders. 13 Unfortunately, the Court
went on to address the permanent replacement issue, which had not
been raised or decided in the proceedings below. In bald and wholly
unsupported dicta, Justice Roberts announced that:
[lit [was not] an unfair labor practice to replace the striking employees
with others in an effort to carry on the business. Although Section 13
provides, 'Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike', it does not follow that
an employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right
to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers. And he is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of
strikers, upon the election of the latter to resume their employment, in
order to create places for them. The assurance by [the company] to those
who accepted employment during the strike that if they so desired their
places might be permanent was not an unfair labor practice nor was it
such to reinstate only so many of the strikers as there were vacant places
to be filled.
14
This ill-conceived dicta has evolved over 56 years, in conjunction with
subsequent legal, economic, and political developments, to the point
that collective bargaining in the United States has been reduced virtu-
ally to an exercise in "collective begging." 5
ITH. LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
SUBSEQUENT TO THE MACKAY DECISION
It is undoubtedly an understatement to observe that the labor rela-
tions arena in the United States is vastly different in the 1990s than it
was in the 1930s. Legal, economic, and political developments and
trends all have coalesced to severely erode collective bargaining and
the right to strike. A review of these developments and trends, and
their impact on collective bargaining, suggests that a compelling need
has arisen to restore a semblance of balance to collective bargaining
by banning the hiring of permanent replacements for economic strikers.
13. 304 U.S. at 346.
14. Id. at 345-46 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
15. H.R. Rep. No. 57, 102nd Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1991).
[Vol. 96:685690
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The contemporary legal arena in which labor must attempt to
conduct collective bargaining and when necessary, a strike, is far less
hospitable than that which existed in the 1930s. Amendments to the
NLRA and countless judicial and NLRB decisions have undermined
the right to strike which, at least in theory, rests at the core of rights
guaranteed by the NLRA. 16 Unions have lost many of the avenues
available to influence collective bargaining under the original NLRA,
and consequently, the Mackay doctrine is far more potent today than it
was in the 1930s.
When the Mackay doctrine was announced in 1938, unions were
allowed to engage in all sorts of peaceful secondary activities. Strikers
could exert secondary pressure on their employer by appealing to its
customers and suppliers. Secondary picketing, sympathy strikes, con-
sumer picketing of a struck employer's suppliers and customers, and
the use of hot cargo agreements 7 all were permissible tactics in labor
disputes. Unions in the 1930s were allowed to negotiate closed shop
agreements, which assured that only union members who were bound
by internal union rules (including those enforcing strike solidarity)
were hired. The Taft-Hartley and Landrum-Griffin amendments to the
NLRA in 1947 and 1959, respectively, outlawed these union tactics.
Specifically, the Taft-Hartley amendments added a panoply of
union unfair labor practices to the NLRA. Secondary boycotts were ex-
pressly outlawed,1 8 and a potent provision allowing employers to file
damage actions against unions violating the ban against secondary
boycotts was added.' 9 The Taft-Hartley Act also outlawed the closed
shop nationwide and gave each individual state the option to pass so-
called "right to work" statutes banning union shop arrangements.20
16. The Act provides: "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right. 29 U.S.C. §
163 (1988) (Taft-Hartley Amendments in italics).
17. Hot cargo agreements essentially authorize secondary boycotts on a prospective
basis. Historically, such agreements allowed the unionized workers of secondary employers
to refuse to handle goods produced by an employer with whom another union had a labor
dispute, such as an employer attempting to operate during a strike.
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1988).
20. The Supreme Court has ruled that union membership cannot be required of em-
7
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Finally, the Taft-Hartley amendments expressly protected the "right to
refrain" from engaging in concerted activities,21 a provision which has
been construed broadly by the NLRB and courts. 'In 1959, the
Landrum-Griffin amendments, inter alia, banned peaceful consumer
picketing of a struck employer's suppliers and customers,22 outlawed
hot cargo agreements,23 and limited the period in which replaced
strikers can vote in decertification elections to one year.24
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Mackay also have eroded
the right to strike substantially, especially in recent years. In 1983, the
Supreme Court held that permanent replacement workers who are
displaced to make way for returning economic strikers may sue their
employer based on a common law misrepresentation theory.25 The
Court in 1985 eviscerated a union's ability to maintain and enforce
respect for its own picket line, ruling that a union rule which forbade
resignations from the union "during a strike or lockout or at a time
when a strike or lockout appears imminent" violated section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the NLRA because it was inconsistent with the policy of "voluntary
unionism."26 The right to strike was eroded further in Trans World
Airlines v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants.27 That case,
ployees subject to a union shop clause. Instead, union membership may, at the employee's
option, be reduced to its "financial core." The most a union can require is the payment of
an agency fee equivalent to union dues without becoming a full-fledged member subject to
union discipline. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). In another line of
decisions, the Supreme Court has further eroded even the limited agency fee obligation,
concluding that unions may charge non-members only for such union activities as are rele-
vant to contract negotiation, contract administration, and grievance adjustment activities, not
for general organizing expenses. Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988); Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435
(1984).
21. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
22. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1988).
23. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b)(4)(A) & (e) (1988).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (1988).
25. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
26. Pattern Makers League of North America v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985).
27. 489 U.S. 426 (1989). The majority opinion evidences what Justice Brennan termed
"an unarticulated hostility toward strikes." 489 U.S. at 447 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
Court effectively ignored labor law principles established in earlier decisions. E.g., NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) (employer offer of post-strike superseniority to
replacements "inherently destructive" of right to strike); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc.,
8
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which arose under the Railway Labor Act,28 upheld an employer's
ability to undermine strike solidarity by ruling that "crossover" em-
ployees, whom the employer induced to abandon the strike and resume
work, need not be displaced to make way for returning strikers with
greater seniority.29 NLRB decisions in the 1980s, far too numerous to
review here, seriously eroded the duty to bargain, right to strike, and
any semblance of balance in the collective bargaining process.3
As the foregoing survey indicates, the contemporary legal climate
for collective bargaining and conducting a strike is a far cry from that
which prevailed in 1938. In addition, powerful economic trends also
must be considered in developing an understanding as to how collec-
tive bargaining and the right to strike reached their current critical
condition. The United States economy flourished in the 1950s and
1960s by embracing and perfecting the mass production system devel-
oped by Frederick W. Taylor3I and popularized by Henry Ford.32
However, beneath the rosy surface of the post-World War II "social
388 U.S. 26 (1967) (same effect concerning employer offer of added vacation pay to re-
placements).
28. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988).
29. TWA enticdd strikers to "crossover" by assuring them they could retain more
desirable job and domicile assignments which had been occupied by more senior flight
attendants. One management-oriented academic bluntly advocates using this tactic in all labor
disputes, including those arising under the NLRA:
An example of a vulnerable group is commonly the most junior employees. By
providing an incentive to the junior worker to abandon the strike, the employer
may have within its grasp the ability to end the strike or at least to greatly dimin-
ish the union's ability to continue it with effectiveness.
More senior workers will view the defection by junior workers in a decidedly
negative light, and such action by the defectors will be destructive to the cohesive-
ness so desired and required by the union. This is, of course, precisely what the
company hopes to achieve.
Robert W. Schupp, Legal Status of Incentives for Replacement and Striking Workers, 41
LAB. L.J. 311, 312 (1990).
30. See generally Douglas E. Ray, Some Overlooked Aspects of the Strike Replacement
Issue, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 363 (1992).
31. FREDRICK W. TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT (1911).
32. RAY MARSHALL & MARC TUCKER, THINKING FOR A LIVING: EDUCATION AND THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 5-12 (1992); NATIONAL CENTER ON EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMY,
AMERICA'S CHOICE: HIGH SKILLS OR LOW WAGES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
SKILLS OF THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 37-39 (1990).
9
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contract," employers in the 1960s and 1970s were sowing the seeds of
labor's decline by buying and selling businesses to create diversified
conglomerates33 and relocating plants domestically and abroad to
avoid unionization.34
In the late 1970s and 1980s, increasing global competition and the
deregulation of highly unionized industries, including airlines, commu-
nications, and trucking, unleashed powerful competitive pressures."
Bluestone and Bluestone have summarized these economic develop-
ments aptly:
As monopoly profits vanished, firms were left in a serious bind. If their
unions continued to push for wage increases that exceeded productivity
advances, the time-honored method of costlessly passing the difference on
to customers would no longer wash. In this case, firms had an uncomfort-
able choice. They could raise their prices anyway, sacrificing market share;
they could settle for lower profits and the enmity of their stockholders; or
they could aggressively challenge the wage demands of their employees
and insist on economic concessions. In the end, they did all three, but
concentrated overwhelmingly on the last of these options.
The fact that many corporations continued to reward their top execu-
tives with large bonuses despite plummeting sales and declining market
33. Diversification in the 1960s blunted the impact of a strike in one business sector
as a stream of profits continued flowing from its other sectors. Ironically in the 1980s,
diversification was denigrated by leading Wall Street strategists as "diworseification." PETER
LYNCH, ONE UP ON WALL STREET 146-50 (1989). Recently, the strategic mantra for busi-
nesses has been to focus exclusively on a firm's "core business," while divesting all other
business segments.
34. BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETr HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF
AMERICA 164-78 (1982). Professors Bluestone and Harrison noted that:
even as the post-World War II social contract was being developed, companies
were violating the spirit, if not the substance, of the "agreement" by shifting oper-
ations (or differentially expanding) into the Sunbelt, non-union peripheries within
the North, and abroad. During the 1950s and 1960s the practice of running away
from the unions grew so much, that by the 1970s the northern-based industrial
unions had been severely weakened.
Id. at 165. The authors further observed that the establishment of multistate and multination-
al systems of plants allowed employers to take advantage of parallel (duplicative) production
and multiple sourcing schemes, which further diminished the impact of a strike. Id. at 166.
35. BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING OUR FUTURE, 67-68
(1992).
10
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share did not make it any easier for unions to sell "concession bargaining"
to their members.36
The 1980s also were characterized by an explosive increase in the
mobility of capital, evidenced most obviously by "dealmaking," i.e., a
wave of restructurings, divestitures, and leveraged buyouts,37 and a
concomitant diminution in corporate responsibility and sense of com-
mitment to community. 38 Sweeping technological changes in manufac-
turing and service industries, coupled with management's exclusive
control of the workplace, have eroded unions' bargaining power.39
On the political front, the Reagan administration inaugurated a
new era-one in which union-busting through the permanent replace-
ment of economic strikers became entirely acceptable, if not fashion-
able. Reporting the Workplace Fairness Act out of committee, the
Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources observed that:
President Reagan's firing and permanent replacement of 12,000 striking air
traffic controllers in 1981 had a dramatic impact on the way many Ameri-
can employers view strikes, including the view taken by a new generation
of corporate managers. Even though that strike by Federal employees, was
illegal, American employers did not readily make this distinction. President
Reagan's action was regarded by many observers as a signal to the em-
ployer community that it was acceptable to dismiss striking workers. The
events surrounding the air traffic controllers' strike ushered in a much
more aggressive, and even hostile, employer strategy toward lawful
strikes.'
Several studies and surveys confirm that employers' practice of perma-
nently replacing economic strikers increased in the 1980s, in the wake
of the disastrous PATCO strike.
36. Id. at 67.
37. For a devastating, Pulitzer Prize-winning critique of the human toll taken by lever-
aged buyouts in the 1980s, see Susan C. Faludi, Safeway LBO Yields Vast Profits but Ex-
acts A Heavy Human Toll, WALL ST. J., May 16, 1990, at 1, col. 6. "
38. S. Rep. No. 110, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1993); GRAND DESIGNS: THE
IMPACT OF CORPORATE STRATEGIES ON WORKERS, UNIONS, AND COMMUNrIES, supra note
3, at 227-35.
39. Richardson, The Role of Technology in Undermining Union Strength, in RESTOR-
ING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 223-37, supra note 4.
40. S. Rep. No. 110, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1993).
11
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A 1989 study by Professor Cynthia Gramm4 reviewed random
samples of strikes from 1984-88 across the nation and within the state
of New York. The Gramm Study found that permanent replacements
for economic strikers were hired in 23.8% of the New York strikes
and 15.6% of the strikes nationwide and that permanent replacements
were used by employers more than twice as often as temporary re-
placements in each sample.42 Gramm asked managers who previously
had experienced strikes whether they ever had hired replacement work-
ers in the past and tellingly, "[elvery single manager said that this
strike was the first attempt to hire replacement workers. 43
In -1991, the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted a
survey aimed at determining whether the use of permanent replace-
ments increased during the 1980s.44 The GAO Report found that per-
manent replacements actually were hired by employers in approximate-
ly 17% of strikes in both 1985 and 1989; employers announced an
intent to hire permanent replacements in 31% of the strikes in 1985
and 35% in 1989.4' The GAO Report estimated that 14,000 workers
subject to the NLRA were permanently replaced in each year.46
Among experienced management and union representatives who had an
opinion on the issue, 66% of the management and 87% of the union
representatives believed that permanent replacements were used more
frequently in the late 1980s than in the late 1970s.47
Several recent surveys by labor organizations are consistent with
the foregoing reports and disclose the tragic human consequences be-
hind the statistics. Specifically, a survey of 1990 strikes involving
41. CYNTHIA GRAMM, EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN A CHANGING ECONOMY: THE ISSUE OF
REPLACEMENT WORKERS (Economic Policy Institute 1991) [hereinafter GRAM STUDY].
42. Temporary replacements were hired by 6% of the employers nationwide and by
10% of the firms in New York state. Id. at 34.
43. Id.
44. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, STRIKES AND THE USE OF PERMANENT
STRIKE REPLACEMENTS IN THE 1970'S AND 1980's GAO/HRD 91-2 (1991) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT].
45. Id. at 13-16.
46. Id. at 17. Because the study did not include industries subject to the Railway
Labor Act, permanent replacements hired during labor disputes at TWA, Continental Air-
lines, Alaska Airlines, and Eastern Airlines, among others, were not included in the total.
47. Id. at 18-20.
[Vol. 96:685
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1000 or more workers by the AFL-CIO Employee Benefits Department
disclosed that health care benefits were a major issue for 55% of the
strikers, and 65% of the workers who were replaced (permanently or
temporarily) struck over health care as a major issue.48 A survey of
strike activity within the United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultur-
al Implement Workers Union disclosed that in 62% of the strikes,
permanent replacements were hired before, immediately after, or within
two weeks of, the onset of the strike.4 9 A United Steelworkers of
America survey of labor disputes involving replacement workers, pri-
marily between 1983 and 1991, disclosed that workers struck simply to
resist wage and benefit concessions in 61% of the strikes, and almost
64% of the workers who engaged in economic strikes were permanent-
ly replaced.50
IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF WORKPLACE FAIRNESS REFORM
Broadly stated, there are three principal arguments in favor of
workplace fairness reform. First, abolishing the Mackay doctrine will
restore a measure of balance to the collective bargaining process by
redressing the extreme inequality of leverage which currently prevails.
Second, it will restore equity to labor law, eliminate unnecessary hu-
man suffering, and harmonize labor law with the larger body of labor
and employment law, which does not permit employees to lose their
jobs for exercising protected legal rights. Finally, it will facilitate,
rather than frustrate, this nation's ability to compete in a global econo-
my by encouraging legitimate strategies for labor-management coopera-
tion based on equal bargaining power and mutual respect.
48. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYEE BENEFITS, AFL-CIO, THE PERMANENT REPLACEMENT
OF WORKERS STRIKING OVER HEALTH CARE BENEFiTs IN 1990 4-5 (March 1991).
49. International Union, UAW Survey, reprinted in Prohibiting Discrimination Against
Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 218-21 (1991).
50. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, STRIKER REPLACEMENT SURVEY
(June 8, 1992).
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A. Restoring Balance to Collective Bargaining
In order to function properly, collective bargaining requires that
the parties have adequate negotiating leverage and comparable incen-
tives to resolve conflict in a mutually beneficial manner.5' Employers'
overwhelming power to transform an economic dispute about wages
and benefits into an epic struggle for a union's survival presents a
stark contrast with the modest economic weapons at labor's disposal.
Walter Kamiat, Associate General Counsel of the AFL-CIO, aptly
expressed this point as follows:
In comparing the employer's Mackay weapon with the economic weapons
utilized by employees, it is important at the outset to recognize an endur-
ing truth regarding virtually all employee weapons: ultimately ... employ-
ees cannot harm their employer's firm without harming themselves. This
fact provides a limitation on the bargaining demands of a union as well as
on the union's willingness to strike or utilize other economic weapons
against the employer. It is simply not in the employees' interests to burden
the employer with costs that will render the firm unable to compete and
thus unable to provide secure employment.
No matter how bitter a strike may be, strikers normally envision only
the imposition of temporary hardships on the employer. Strikers fully
51. Establishing and maintaining a balance of power between employers and employ-
ees was one of the principal goals of the original Wagner Act. The NLRA provides, inter
alia, that:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers . . . substan-
tially burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent
business depressions, by depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage
earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that the protection by law of the right of employees
to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental
to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to
wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees.
29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988) (emphasis added).
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expect that they and the employer will, at the strike's end, resume their
long-term continuing relationship to their mutual advantage.5"
Abolishing the Mackay doctrine will restore at least some balance to
the collective bargaining process by taking away employers' ability to
undermine with impunity unions' only meaningful economic weapon.
Critics of workplace fairness reform assert that it will disturb a
"delicate balance" in collective bargaining and result in a dramatic in-
crease in strike activity. It is charged that unions will be emboldened
to make irresponsible and unreasonable bargaining demands. This theo-
ry overlooks several considerations. First, a panoply of options remain
open to employers seeking to continue operating their business during
a strike,53 even" under the most restrictive workplace reform proposals.
Employers faced with economic strikes still may hire temporary
replacement workers 54 and use supervisory and other personnel to
maintain their business. They may transfer work to nonstruck facilities
and subcontract for the performance of bargaining unit work.55 Em-
ployers may stockpile inventories in advance of a strike and rely on
strike insurance.56 They also may lock out potential strikers, at a time
strategically selected by the employer to maximize negotiating lever-
age.57 Finally, employers may close their business temporarily and
allow the rigors of unemployment to wear down the strikers and even-
tually force concessions and a settlement.5 8 Under these circumstanc-
52. Kamiat, supra note 8, at 43.
53. CHARLES R. PERRY ET AL., OPERATING DURING STRIKES: COMPANY EXPERIENCE,
NLRB POLICIES, AND GOVERNMENTAL REGULATIONS 58-68 (Wharton Sch. Lab. Rel. & Pub.
Pbl. Series No. 23, 1982); Gillespie, supra note 8, at 790-91.
54. Gillespie, supra note 8. Competent management attorneys easily can advise em-
ployers how to avoid potential liability to replacement workers under Belknap, Inc. v. Hale,




58. Typically, strikers are not eligible for unemployment benefits. If their union pays
any strike benefits at all, they seldom approach a level of 25% of regular compensation.
Many union workers live paycheck to paycheck, and do not have any significant accumulat-
ed savings to cushion their families during an economic strike.
699
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es, there is no appreciable risk that workplace fairness reform will
spawn a wave of irresponsible strikes.
Second, and equally important, the theory that unions will become
strike-happy is unwarranted in light of the extreme mobility of capital
which characterizes the contemporary global economy, even more so
after passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).59 Professors Craypo and Nissen predict that the economic
trends of the 1980s are likely to continue:
[W]e would expect that the widespread dislocations of the 1980's would
embolden opportunist firms to make heavy demands on unions and com-
munities in the 1990's and for the latter to accept them. Unions will ac-
cept such demands in view of the threat of plant shutdowns and to pre-
serve jobs that still pay comparatively well in a period of overall decline
in real wages and of a proliferation of low-wage service-producing jobs. In
addition, communities can be expected to pressure unions and workers to
accept the new labor relations . . . community leaders believe that retain-
ing and creating any manufacturing jobs at all takes priority over challeng-
ing the terms and conditions of employment.60
59. Workplace fairness reform will not place the U.S. at a competitive disadvantage in
the global economy as our major trading partners, Germany, Japan, France, and Canada, ban
permanent replacements for economic strikers. H.R. Rep. No. 116, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.
33 (1993). Economist William Spriggs has expressed the point this way:
With the exception of South Africa, no other Western industrialized country allows
employers to interfere with the exercise of workers' right to strike.
Canada adopted the Wagner Act as a model for its labor laws, yet rejects the
Mackay rule as inconsistent with free collective bargaining. All Canadian provinc-
es . . . require the reinstatement of striking employees to their jobs at the conclu-
sion of a work stoppage. All measures of profitability show that comparable U.S.
firms operating in Canada without the Mackay rule are as profitable as American
firms operating under Mackay in the United States.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on
Education and Labor on H.R. 5, the Striker Replacement Bill, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. 324
(1992) (statement of William E. Spriggs, Ph.D.)
60. GRAND DESIGNS: THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE STRATEGIES ON WORKERS, UNIONS,
AND COMMUNrTIES, supra note 3, at 238. They note that unions will have to develop new
bases of institutional power to combat these relentless economic trends:
unions [must] change their own grand design from one that depends exclusively on
sustaining a . . . relationship with management, which may sever that relationship
at any time, to one that focuses on creating strategic alliances with other
stakeholders who stand to lose from corporate reorganizations and relocations.
[Vol. 96:685
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Thus, the harsh realities of the economic and political climate for the
foreseeable future are such that barring the permanent replacement of
economic strikers is not likely to trigger a raft of strikes based on
unrealistic bargaining demands.
A final consideration in assessing the impact of the Mackay doc-
trine on the balance of power in labor-management relations is the
recognition that it poisons union organizing efforts as well. Apart from
running a gauntlet of discriminatory discharges and interminable ad-
ministrative delays, culminating with inadequate remedies,61 those em-
ployees who consider voting for a union routinely face a barrage of
speeches and letters in which the employer advises them they will
have to strike to secure a contract and will be permanently replaced
when they strike.62 Even before a union has been certified as the ex-
clusive bargaining representative and collective bargaining commences,
the Mackay doctrine is a potent deterrent to union organizing that
unfairly tips the balance of power in favor of employers.
B. Equitable Considerations and Avoiding Unnecessary Human
Suffering
Increasingly during the last 14 years, the Mackay Doctrine has
caused widespread and unnecessary human suffering and misery. Re-
calcitrant employers, aided and abetted by the merchants of misery
(union-busting law firms and unsavory guard services with ubiquitous
video cameras),63 have discarded loyal employees, many of whom
have invested decades in their jobs, simply for engaging in "protected"
conduct, which is their only significant means of improving or main-
Three ways in which some unions have sought new allies to challenge business
hegemony are by establishing control over mergers and acquisitions, undertaking
corporate campaigns, and building labor-community coalitions.
Id. at 245.
61. See, e.g., DUNLOP COMMISSION FAcr-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-80;
RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW, supra note 4, at 61-121; GOULD,
supra note 4; Weiler, supra note 4.
62. Pollitt, supra note 8, at 306-07; Kamiat, supra note 8, at 34-35.
63. See generally From Coal to Diamonds, LEGAL TMES, July 24, 1989, at 1.
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taining working conditions. The law pertaining to economic strikers
holds the dubious and inequitable distinction of being the only niche in
the whole field of labor and employment in which employees may lose
their job for engaging in protected activity.64 It is also the only area
in labor and employment law where an incumbent employee's accrued
seniority-ordinarily a precious commodity6--is so devalued that it is
of no consequence against the job rights of a "permanent" replacement.
The stories of economic strikers who have been permanently replaced,
frequently after their unions have made extensive concessions in col-
lective bargaining, are poignant and probative in their own right of the
need to restore equity to the law.
Karen Behnke worked for Curtis Industries in a Cleveland, Ohio
suburb for almost 24 years. 66  The family-owned company went
through a leveraged buyout in the 1980s, and new management in
1987 successfully demanded concessions from the UAW, which had
represented employees without a strike for 40 years. When the collec-
tive bargaining contract expired on April 5, 1990, all 95 employees
struck. The next day, they received a letter from the Director of Em-
ployee Relations encouraging them to crossover the picket line, ex-
64. Critics of workplace fairness reform are quick to argue that a significant distinc-
tion exists between being fired and permanently replaced in that economic strikers retain
preferential recall rights after their union makes an unconditional offer to return to work. As
the Senate Labor Committee has observed:
the fact that one has not been (illegally) discharged but rather (legally) permanent-
ly replaced is truly a distinction without a difference.
It is impossible to convince a long-term, conscientious employee of the law's
justice after the employee has lost a job for doing no more than exercising a
protected right.
S. Rep. No. 110, 103rd Congress, 1st Sess. 16 (1993).
65. Ordinarily, accrued seniority and incumbent status are among the most sacrosanct
benefits recognized by labor and employment law. See generally FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA
A. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS Ch. 14 (4th ed. 1985) ("One of the most severe
limitations upon the exercise of managerial discretion is the requirement of seniority recog-
nition."); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (seniority system in collective
bargaining agreement which perpetuated pre-Act discrimination was exempt from Title VII
of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
66. Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102nd Cong.,
1st Sess. 63-65 (1991) (statement of Karen Behnke, replaced striker).
[Vol. 96:685
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plaining how to resign from the union, and advising that, "[d]uring an
economic strike . .. you could be permanently replaced . .. this com-
pany has a federally protected right to fred people to work in your
place and [you will] not get [your] jobs back just because the strike
ends."6 7 Indeed, replacements were hired immediately and made per-
manent within three or four months.68 Ms. Behnke explained the con-
sequences:
The strike has caused enormous hardship for the strikers and their families.
Most of the strikers have suffered financially. With no regular paychecks,
they have had to use up their savings in order to get by. It has been diffi-
cult to get temporary jobs because other employers won't hire us once
they learn we are on strike at Curtis Industries.
One striker had her heat and telephone turned off because she could
not make payments. She thought she was going to lose her home. She had
diabetes and went into a coma. Because her phone was turned off, she
was not discovered for 2 days and almost died.
The strike has also placed enormous stress on the families of the
strikers. Many ...are depressed over having been rejected by the compa-
ny after so many years of loyal service. You can see the tension and grief
on their faces.6 9
In recent years, the contentious issue of health care costs which cannot
be solved in the limited context of a single bargaining relationship has
caused a number of strikes, many of which resulted in the permanent
replacement of strikers.
In Hope, Arkansas, Juanita Landmesser was the head of a UAW
Local which since 1960 had represented workers at Champion Parts
Rebuilders; they averaged $6 per hour.70 Having already been granted
concessions in the previous round of negotiations, the company in
1991 demanded that workers continue paying 24% of premiums; pay a
substantially increased deductible and a 20% copayment for costs
67. Id. at 71.
68. Id. at 63-64.
69. Id. at 64.
70. Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the
Subcomm on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103rd Cong.,
1st Sess. 50-53 (1993) (statement of Juanita Landmesser, replaced striker).
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above the deductible; and accept reduced maximum payments of
$35,000 (down from $250,000) a year and $100,000 over a lifetime.
When the strike began, several UAW members had major health prob-
lems costing over $50,000 per worker.
The union accepted the increased deductible and 20% copayments,
offered concessions on payments for psychological treatment, but re-
jected the $35,000 yearly cap on claims. The company refused to
budge and the result was predictable:
Champion was a profitable company. We never heard the company plead
poverty .... But with an unemployment rate in the community above
9%, there were many individuals ready to step into our jobs during the
strike. We are now convinced that the company knew we could not accept
such severe cuts in health care and that it planned to force us out on
strike in order to bring in permanent replacements.7'
Out of 300 strikers, "less than ten" found comparable jobs, 60% ap-
plied for and received government assistance, including food stamps
and AFDC, and "a lot of families [were] broken up."72  Ms.
Landmesser found work as a hamburger cook in her husband's restau-
rant, and many co-workers ended up at McDonald's and Burger King.
Professor Julius Getman's field study73 of the ill-fated strike by
Local 14 of the Paperworkers Union at an International Paper Co. mill
in Jay, Maine, examines the human dimensions of the Mackay doctrine
from every perspective in exhaustive detail. Striker Tom Pratt regarded
himself as lucky for getting another job, even though the strike deplet-
ed his savings for home improvement and his children's education. He
described the family rifts caused in the Jay community as follows:
Some were not as fortunate as I was. There were divorces. There were
problems, physical [and] mental. It's devastating. You're pitting brother
against brother in many cases ... I saw one brother on one side of the
coin and the other as a striker and they literally would fight each other
because one was working for the company and one was not . . .All of
71. Id. at 51.
72. Id. at 53.
73. Julius G. Getman & F. Ray Marshall, Industrial Relations in Transition: The Pa-
per Industry Example, 102 YALE L.J. 1803 (1993).
[Vol. 96:685
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the top management that makes these decisions, they don't live here in this
town. They live in towns removed from the area.74
Former Town Manager Charles Noonan said of the strike: "It has
caused tremendous problems in the social fabric of the community. It
has torn the community apart. Friendships that existed for lifetimes are
gone; people who went to high school together and grew up together
will not speak to each other."
75
Workplace fairness reform would correct the perverse inequity
created by the Mackay doctrine by factoring strikers' years of loyal
service and accrued seniority into the calculus. Employers would retain
a variety of options available to continue running their business, in-
cluding relying on temporary replacements. Under this arrangement,
economic strikers still would suffer all the usual hardships associated
with work stoppages and be protected solely from the catastrophic
economic and emotional harm of losing their job. Replacement workers
would experience a mere opportunity loss, i.e., the ability to perma-
nently displace a striker.
Workplace fairness reform also would correct the inequity intro-
duced into labor law by the Supreme Court's decision in Trans World
Airlines v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants.76 Specifically,
the rights of economic strikers would be elevated to a status equal to
the rights of crossover employees, who have exercised their Taft-
Hartley Act "right to refrain" from engaging in concerted activity.77
This is only fair and equitable, particularly in light of a line of Su-
preme Court decisions7 8 which take an expansive view of the scope
of employees' "right to refrain."
Workplace fairness reform also will bring the NLRA into line
with all other federal and state anti-discrimination statutes, as well as a
74. Id. at 1844-45.
75. Id. at 1844.
76. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
78. See Pattern Makers League of North America v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985); see
also NLRB v. Textile Workers Union, Local 1029, Granite State Joint Board, 409 U.S. 213
(1972) (fines imposed for strikebreaking activities subsequent to individuals' resignation from
union violated NLRA).
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substantial body of caselaw establishing exceptions for individual em-
ployees in many states to employment at will. As Professor Weiler has
observed, employers are not permitted to defend lawsuits brought un-
der other anti-discrimination statutes, nor common law suits for dis-
charge in violation of public policy, on the theory that the employee in
question was "permanently replaced" rather than discharged because
such a contention would be "laughed out of court. ' 7 9 Indeed, but for
the Mackay doctrine, the circumstances surrounding the replacement of
an economic striker would constitute an overwhelming case of discrim-
ination-an employer has taken an adverse action against a cognizable
group of employees for an explicitly-stated reason, in close temporal
proximity to the exercise of "protected" activity. No principled basis
exists for differentiating the rights of economic strikers from those
enjoyed by employees under other anti-discrimination statutes and
judicially-created exceptions to employment at will. Discrimination is
discrimination, and the NLRA should be elevated to a status of equal
dignity with other statutes and common law doctrines.
C. Enhancing Legitimate Cooperation Between Labor and
Management
In an era when public policy should facilitate legitimate (but not
superficial) strategies for labor-management cooperation, the Mackay
doctrine promotes conflict.80 Hiring permanent replacements is the
most confrontational step an employer can take in a labor dispute. The
results are understandable bitterness on the part of strikers,8 and on
79. GRAMM STUDY, supra note 41, at 75.
80. As Professor Getman has observed, the Mackay doctrine in recent years has oper-
ated as a perverse incentive for employers to engage in surface bargaining so as to provoke
a strike, as a means of getting rid of union supporters and/or th6 union itself. Getman &
Marshall, supra note 73, at 1880-81.
81. The sentiments of many strikers are captured by the following definition of a
scab, attributed to Jack London:
The Scab
After God had finished the rattlesnake, the toad, and the vampire, He had
some awful substance left with which he made a scab.
A scab is a two-legged animal with a corkscrew soul, a water brain, a com-
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occasion, picket line violence. Hiring permanent replacements dramati-
cally complicates the settlement of a strike, inasmuch as the future
status of the replacement workers immediately becomes the paramount
issue, apart from whatever differences prompted the work stoppage in
the first instance. Moreover, the hiring of permanent replacements
more than triples the average length of strikes from 27.26 days to
84.23 days. 2 Thus, the Mackay doctrine promotes conflict rather than
cooperation.
Another irony of the Mackay doctrine is that it decimates precisely
the type of employees most likely to succeed in legitimate schemes of
labor-management cooperation. Professors Getman and Marshall have
stated the point well:
The employees most capable of subordinating their own interests to those
of a group-those who refuse to cross the picket line in the face of per-
manent replacement-are the ones most likely to be replaced permanently
under the doctrine. The [International Paper strikers] demonstrated through-
out their struggle the characteristics that are most valuable to jointness
programs: group cohesiveness, loyalty, creativity, discipline, intelligence,
and decency.
They were not guilty of disloyalty, greed, or excessive zeal for com-
bat. These are precisely the type of people whose interests the law is
intended to protect. Yet they are the ones most likely to be permanently
replaced under the [Mackay] Doctrine.
8 3
Hiring permanent replacements substitutes an inexperienced, divid-
ed, 4 and ultimately demoralized workforce for a productive, cohesive
When a scab comes down the street, men turn their backs and Angels weep
in Heaven, and the Devil shuts the gates of hell to keep him out.
a SCAB is a traitor to his God, his country, his family, and his class.
Old Dominion Branch, No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264
(1974) (emphasis in original).
82. John F. Schnell & Cynthia L. Gramm, The Empirical Relations Between
Employers' Striker Replacement Strategies and Strike Duration, 47 INDUS. & LAB. RELS.
REV. 189, 194-95 (1994). The authors found that a mere threat to hire permanent replace-
ments more than doubled the average duration of strikes in which the employer neither
announced the intent to hire nor hired permanent replacements, from 27.26 days to 57.3
days. Id.
83. Getman & Marshall, supra note 73, at 1802-03.
84. Presumably, some strikers will be recalled after their union makes an unconditional
23
Turner: Restoring Balance to Collective Bargaining: Prohibiting Discrimin
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1994
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96:685
workforce. Even viewing the Mackay doctrine solely from the perspec-
tive of profits and impact on shareholder value, there is substantial
evidence that union-busting simply is an unwise business practice.
85
Astute observers of the coal industry believe that is the lesson of the
Pittston strike.1
6
If enacted, workplace fairness reform will enhance industrial peace
and stability. Employers no longer will have any incentive, nor the
offer to return to work under Laidlaw v. NLRB, 171 NLRB 1366 (1968), enfd, 414 F.2d
99 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970).
85. STEPHEN SLEIGH Er AL., UNION BUSTING IS BAD FOR BUSINESS (Center for La-
bor-Management Policy Studies 1992) (finding high-profile strikes of 1980s caused substan-
tial declines in shareholder equity: Phelps Dodge Corp., 25%; Tribune Co./New York Daily
News strike, 28.5%. Pittston, Inc., 18.5%; Caterpillar, Inc., 7.1%); AFL-CIO INDUSTRIAL
UNION DEPARTMENT, THE COSTS OF AGGRESSION 2-5 (1992) (noting substantial losses by
Greyhound due to labor dispute and 30% reduction in sales revenue at Ravenswood Alumi-
num Corp. from 1989-91); UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERiCA, RAVENSWOOD ALUMINUM
CORP.: A STAKEHOLDERS REPORT (1991); Brian E. Becker & Craig A. Olson, The Impact
of Strikes on Shareholder Equity, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 425 (1986) (survey of ma-
jor strikes from 1962-82 demonstrated average decline in equity of $72-87 million, 4.1% of
shareholder value).
86. Professor Birecree has expressed the teaching of the Pittston strike as follows:
In the final analysis the case suggests that for employers, employees and communi-
ty members alike, more cooperative approaches to competitive problems, no matter
their severity, are preferable to forcing a solution. In the union's defense, it ap-
pears that the UMWA leadership recognized this fact but was unable to convince
company officials of its validity. As one industry observer put it, further labor
upheavals will only lead to further industry restructuring, in which efficient opera-
tors with solid production contracts and harmonious labor relations will be sitting
pretty.
Adrienne M. Birecree, Structural Determinants of Aggressive Labor Relations in Bituminous
Coal Mining: The Pittston Company Labor Dispute 1988-1990 (Spring 1992) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
87. The Secretary of Labor, Robert B. Reich, has explained the Clinton
Administration's support of the Workplace Fairness Act as follows:
the economy we are entering . . . is [one] in which workers and managers have
got to become partners . . . . It is time to close the chapter on a period of hostil-
ity and distrust, a period in which labor felt and still feels that it cannot rely
upon the good faith of many executives and many managers in this country.
The permanent replacement of striking workers has left a lot of scars, a lot
of distrust . . . I am surprised and disturbed by the degree of distrust that still
exists, a lot of that holdover from the 1980's from Eastern Airlines, from
Greyhound, from Pittston, from Caterpillar.
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unilateral discretion, to destroy their bargaining partner. With the fun-
damental issue of job loss due to an economic strike out of the way,
public policy will promote mutual respect between the parties and the
resolution of labor disputes. Ideally, management would voluntarily
embrace cooperative approaches predicated on mutual respect. 88
Where reason and judgment are lacking, as they are on this issue, a
statutory proscription is necessary to prevent union-busting.
To the extent that public policy seeks to promote a high skills,
high wage economy,89 as distinguished from a low skills, low wage
model of work organization, viable unions have an invaluable role to
play in the process. Former Secretary of Labor Ray Marshall explains
that:
S. . [There is a connection between not permitting the permanent replacement of
striking workers and moving to a new era; closing the book on this old era of
hostility and distrust and moving on to a new era in which we can really build a
partnership between labor and management.
Prohibiting Discrimination Against Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6
(1993) (statement of Robert B. Reich, Secretary of Labor).
88. Coal industry management opposes workplace fairness reform, as do all other
segments of the business community. The National Coal Association (NCA) claims that such
reform would "seriously undermine" companies' ability to negotiate and service long-term
supply contracts. While conceding that "temporary replacement workers can be hired...
which would enable coal companies to fulfill commitments," the NCA contends that such
workers would not be sufficiently attentive to safety, and that offering permanent status
would be necessary to induce skilled workers to accept jobs. Prohibiting Discrimination
Against Economic Strikers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 91-93 (1993) (prepared statement of
NCA).
As the 1992-93 national contract negotiations indicate, the industry is, at best, am-
bivalent about the existence of the UMWA. B.R. Brown, CEO of CONSOL, Inc., and lead
negotiator for the BCOA, has derided the UMWA's job security initiative in the recent
negotiations as "the institutional security issue." Brown further charges that "the union's
hidden agenda was the perpetuation of the union as an organization." B.R. Brown, Remarks
to the 12th Annual World Coal Conference of the Mississippi Valley Coal Exporters Coun-
cil 2 (Feb. 10, 1994) (on file with the West Virginia Law Review).
89. See generally ROBERT B. REICH, THE WORK OF NATIONs (1992); MARSHALL &
TUCKER, supra note 32; NATIONAL CENTER ON EDUCATION AND THE ECONOMY, supra note
32.
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[Unions in the 1930's and 1940's enjoyed favorable public opinion in part]
due to the belief that unions were good for the economy because they
helped maintain purchasing power, in keeping with the prevailing
Keynesian policies. However, these policies became anachronistic in a
more competitive internationalized information world, which also makes the
oligopolistic mass production system less effective. This leads some people
to believe that unions have become obsolete. I have argued that this is a
false conclusion: high performance organizations require much greater
worker involvement, which, in turn is most effective if workers have an
independent source of power to represent their interests.
Stronger labor movements are clearly in the national interest. The
U.S. should therefore modernize its labor relations laws to make it easier
for workers to organize and bargain collectively and more difficult for em-
ployers to thwart those rights by legal and illegal means.9°
The permanent replacement of economic strikers is at the top of the
list of "legal means" for employers to thwart employees' rights.
Workplace fairness reform is necessary to establish a foundation of
mutual respect on which collective bargaining can emphasize common
interests, rather than antagonism.91
90. Ray Marshall, Work Organization, Unions, and Economic Performance, in UNIONS
AND ECONOMIC CoMPETmvENEss 312-13 (Mishel & Voos eds., 1992).
A more thorough analysis of the constructive role unions can play in fostering em-
ployee participation and other work organization improvements has been undertaken by Pro-
fessors Eaton and Voos. They conclude that the supposed "flexibility" enjoyed by non-union
employers is illusory, particularly over the long term, because only union workplaces have
institutions equipped to engage in serious productivity bargaining. In their view, unionized
employers have better potential to realize the benefits of employee participation because
unions (1) protect workers against job loss due to productivity improvements or management
reprisal; (2) provide a "collective voice" for workers in the design and organization of a
participation program over the long-term; and (3) may extend participation from the
shopfloor to the entire enterprise. Paula B. Eaton & Adrienne E. Voos, Unions and Contem-
porary Innovations, ilz WORK ORGANIZATION, COMPENSATION, AND EMPLOYEE pARTICIPA-
TION 173-215 (Mishel & Voos eds., 1992).
91. The AFL-CIO recently has embraced the notion that unions have an important role
to play in developing a new model of work organization, based on five basic principles: (1)
a rejection of the traditional dichotomy between thinking and doing, as well as conception
and execution; (2) redesigning of jobs to include a wider variety of skills and greater re-
sponsibility for the ultimate output of the enterprise; (3) substitution of a flatter management
structure for the traditional multi-layered hierarchy; (4) union involvement in decision-making
at all levels of the enterprise; and (5) distribution of the rewards realized from the new
model on equitable terms arrived at through collective bargaining. AFL-CIO COMMITTEE ON
[Vol. 96:685
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V. ANALYSIS OF WORKPLACE FAnmEsS REFORM ALTERNATIVES
The debate over workplace fairness reform has generated several
alternative proposals. 92 These include: (1) banning the hiring of per-
manent replacements for a fixed period of time; (2) permitting the
hiring of permanent replacements only in cases of "business necessity";
(3) permitting the hiring of permanent replacements only after a union
refuses to accept non-binding mediation; and (4) banning permanent
replacements for economic strikers (as well as crossover inducements)
entirely. The first two proposals are wholly inadequate or unworkable
for various reasons. The third alternative represents a coherent but less
than optimal solution. An outright ban on permanent replacements and
crossover incentives is the preferable alternative.
Placing a time limit on hiring permanent replacements is unsat-
isfactory in several respects. Employers inclined toward union-busting
simply will go through the motions of bargaining,93 wait for the
deadline to pass, and proceed to hire permanent replacements. Every
labor dispute takes on its own character based on the parties' relative
strength and objectives and an arbitrary time limit which is meaningful
in one strike may be inconsequential in another. Finally, the time limit
approach fails to remove the job security issue from negotiations, and
does little to foster legitimate labor-management cooperation over the
long term. The best that can be said is that a time limit on hiring
permanent replacements would be a bright-line standard for both sides.
Some commentators94 and jurists95 have advocated allowing the
hiring of permanent replacements in cases of "business necessity."
THE EVOLuTION OF WORK, THE NEW AMERICAN WORKPLACE: A LABOR PERSPECrIVE (Feb.
1994).
92. GOULD, supra note 4, at 194-203.
93. Although the NLRA imposes a mandatory duty to bargain in good faith, any
moderately sophisticated employer can discharge its legal obligation through perfectly lawful
"hard bargaining." See generally PATRICK HARDIN, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 624 (3d
ed. 1992).
94. Gillespie, supra note 8.
95. Trans World Airlines v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants, 489 U.S. at
464-66 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Apart from the fact that "business necessity" in the context of an eco-
nomic strike is something of an oxymoron, this approach is seriously
flawed. Litigation as to whether the requisite "necessity" exists un-
doubtedly would be complex and protracted-a boon to labor law-
yers,96 but certainly not their clients.97 Defining "business necessity"
would be problematic given the various permutations and combinations
of business enterprises, and the definition would be susceptible to
manipulation through creative accounting practices. Unions would have
difficulty assessing whether "business necessity" existed in a given
instance because they ordinarily lack access to an employer's books in
strike situations.98
A far more sophisticated proposal than the business necessity
exception is the Packwood Amendment. 99 The Packwood Amendment
would condition an employer's ability to replace economic strikers on
a union's willingness to accept non-binding recommendations by a
tripartite mediation board composed of one labor and one management
representative, and an independent mediator. 1°° Unions would have to
observe certain procedural requirements to secure protection against
permanent replacement, 01 the existing collective bargaining agree-
96. A recurrent concern flowing from high-profile, protracted labor disputes is that
hardline management attorneys face an arguable conflict of interest with their clients. Some
observers have noted that such attorneys may prolong the dispute as long as possible to
continue generating hourly billings, while the client's interests would be better served by an
expeditious settlement. From Coal to Diamonds, supra note 63.
97. GOULD, supra note 4, at 193. Some type of administrative or judicial approval or
certification could be required before allowing employers to hire permanent replacements.
However, appeals would drag on and difficulties in sorting out job rights would result in
the event of a reversal on appeal. If employers were not required to obtain prior approval
or certification, the same problem would obtain in the event that subsequent litigation result-
ed in a judgment that the employer did not satisfy the business necessity exception.
98. In NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956), the Supreme Court
ruled that an employer must open its books for inspection if it unequivocably claims inabili-
ty to pay in collective bargaining. However, this rule has little impact as competent man-
agement attorneys routinely advise employers how to avoid the "poverty" exception to the
general rule of non-disclosure.
99. 138 CONG. REC. S7932-33 (daily ed. June 11, 1992) (summary of Packwood
Amendment), and S8056-89 (text).
100. If it rejected mediation altogether, a union could strike. However, the strikers
would be subject to permanent replacement as a consequence. Id.
101. Specifically, a union would be required to give seven days' notice to the employ-
712 [Vol. 96:685
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ment would be extended to maintain the status quo, and a strike would
be barred while a 45-day fact-finding process ran its course. If an em-
ployer refused to accept mediation--either before or after the fact-
finding process-it could not hire permanent replacements. If a union
rejected the findings of the mediation board, an employer would be
free to hire permanent replacements; however, a union would be able
to terminate such hiring by accepting the board's recommendations
after a strike began.
The Packwood Amendment constitutes a complex but comprehen-
sive dispute resolution mechanism; it is an interesting blend of man-
dates and options. From labor's standpoint, it ameliorates the Mackay
doctrine to the extent that a union could take unilateral action which
would preclude the hiring of permanent replacements. Given its inher-
ently Solomonic nature, it is not surprising that neither labor nor man-
agement evinces much enthusiasm for the Packwood Amendment."°2
Historically, the proposal has not generated enough additional votes in
the Senate to invoke cloture and defeat a Republican filibuster.
Labor's lack of enthusiasm for the Packwood Amendment flows
from its traditional hostility to third-party dispute resolution mecha-
nisms as a substitute for collective bargaining. 10 3 Stronger unions,
which have maintained a semblance of pattern bargaining within an
industry, fear that the Packwood Amendment will cause an erosion of
labor standards. However, acceptance of the Packwood Amendment by
labor may serve to illuminate management's motives in opposing it.
No employer that accepts a union as a legitimate bargaining partner
could reject the Packwood Amendment entirely. Insofar as it opposes
the Packwood Amendment, management apparently seeks to retain
unilateral discretion to destroy a union during an economic strike.
The final and certainly most desirable workplace reform proposal
is an outright ban on hiring permanent replacement workers during
economic strikes. Senate Bill 55 embraces this approach; it broadly
er and Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service of its willingness to accept the formation
of a fact-finding panel. Id.
102. GOULD, supra note 4, at 195.
103. Id.
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protects workers in all labor disputes where a union is: (1) certified or
recognized as the exclusive bargaining representative or (2) seeking
lawful recognition based on the execution of authorizations from a
majority of employees in the relevant group. 1°4 It also outlaws cross-
over inducements, such as those sanctioned by the Supreme Court in
Trans World Airlines v. Independent Federation of Flight Attendants.
However, the Act would not protect union-represented employees en-
gaged in unauthorized work stoppages, nor unrepresented employees
engaged in spontaneous concerted activities.10 5
Senate Bill 55 restores balance to collective bargaining by elim-
inating management's unilateral discretion to destroy its bargaining
partner, and precludes the human suffering experienced by many eco-
nomic strikers in the 1980s. With this aspect of job security off the
bargaining table,"' 6 the parties should have greater incentive to focus
on resolving legitimate issues in a mutually satisfactory manner. All of
the hardships typically associated with a strike will remain an impetus
for a union to settle the labor dispute. Moreover, elimination of the
risk of permanent replacement should encourage unions to embrace
more innovative approaches to bargaining, such as the "Enterprise
Compact,"107 which are in the long-term interest of both parties.
VI. CONCLUSION
Labor and management currently find themselves at a crossroads,
with one path leading to confrontation and the other to increased coop-
104. See supra note 6.
105. S. Rep. No. 110, 103rd Congress, 1st Sess. 27-30 (1993).
106. Unions still will face the panoply of problems that go with highly mobile capital
and cost-cutting efforts, i.e., plant closings, relocations, contracting out, and the like.
107. BLUESTONE & BLUESTONE, NEGOTATING OUR FUTURE, supra note 34, at 226-40.
As an example, an Enterprise Compact for a manufacturing firm might include the follow-
ing points: (1) mutual agreement on goals for annual productivity improvement; (2) agreed-
upon wage increases with cost of living adjustments; (3) price reductions based on produc-
tivity growth; (4) product quality would be a potential strike issue; (5) agreement on a no-
layoff provision, with workforce reductions to be implemented through attrition and early
retirement incentives; (6) bonus pay based on profit sharing and gain sharing; (7) elimina-
tion of the traditional management rights clause in favor of union involvement in decision-
making at all levels of the enterprise.
[Vol. 96:685
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eration. Standing alone, workplace fairness reform is not a panacea; it
is an important first step toward the workplace of the future. Staunch
opposition to workplace fairness reform by much of the business com-
munity suggests that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, many in manage-
ment rigidly adhere to a system of unilateral, autocratic control of the
workplace. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, unions have an
essential role to play in a high skills, high wage economy-provided
management recognizes their legitimacy. As of this writing, a Senate
vote remains pending. 108 Whatever the outcome, the vote clearly will
influence labor law reform efforts for years to come.
ADDENDUM
Once again, a Republican-led filibuster in the Senate has thwarted
labor law reform. However, it is clear that labor will not walk away
from the effort to ban permanent replacements for economic strikers.
As the Dunlop Commission completes its work and prepares its legis-
lative recommendations, there will be additional opportunities to revisit
the issue. If this country truly wants a high-skills, high wage economy,
we must restore a level playing field for labor and management to
resolve their differences. Political winds are notoriously unpredictable,
and we can only hope the Senate eventually will recognize the merit
of workplace fairness reform.
108. Reich Hopeful Administration Can Overcome Filibuster Attempts on Striker Re-
placement, Daily Labor Report (BNA) No. 76 (Apr. 21, 1994). Workplace reform supporters
apparently need three to four additional votes to overcome a certain Republican filibuster.
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